I. INTRODUCTION
In Kalina v. Fletcher,' the Supreme Court addressed whether the doctrine of absolute prosecutorial immunity protects a prosecutor from liability for attesting to false facts in an affidavit supporting the issuance of an arrest warrant. 2 A unanimous Court held that a prosecutor is not protected by absolute immunity for her action in executing the affidavit. 3 While absolute immunity protects a prosecutor for activities in initiating and prosecuting a case or by otherwise performing acts "intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process," 4 the Court concluded in Kalina that " [t] estifying about facts is the function of the witness, not of the lawyer., 5 The Court found that the prosecutor in Kalina functioned as a complaining witness. 6 Since a complaining witness was accorded only qualified immunity at common law 7 and no policy concerns justified extending absolute immunity to a prosecutor for such an action, 8 the Court declined to accord absolute immunity to the prosecutor in Kalina for attesting to facts. 9 A § 1983 or Bivens suit permits a plaintiff to sue directly the state or federal official who allegedly violated her rights. 23 For purposes of § 1983, a state actor includes persons who derive their authority from a state law or custom. 2 ' A prosecutor is a state actor.25 Thus, when acting "under color of state authority," a prosecutor is subject to suit for violating rights secured to a plaintiff either by the United States Constitution or by a federal statute. 6 The elements of a § 1983 claim include "(1) a violation of a constitutional or federal statutory right; (2) proximately caused; (3) by a 'person;' (4) who acted 'under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia...., 27 The plaintiff may seek compensatory and punitive damages against the official in her individual capacity. 2 For the plaintiff to recover damages in any § 1983 action that would in effect cause the plaintiffs prior conviction or sentence to become invalid, the plaintiff must prove that the prior conviction or sentence has been officially reversed on direct appeal, eliminated by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal, or been the subject of a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. ' Thus, until a court or executive order officially invalidates a disputed conviction or sentence, it cannot form the basis for a § 1983 claim. 0 "SeeRose, supra note 11, at 1022. See, e.g., Moore v. Valder, 65 F.3d 189, 191 (D.C. Cir. 1995) . 24 See supra note 10 for the text of § 1983.
2See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 420-29 (1976) ; Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U. S. 42, 50-53 (1992) . 2Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 172 (1961) . 2Rose, supra note 11, at 1023 n.34 (quoting Martin A. Schwartz &John E. Kirklin, SECrON 1983 LITIGATION: CLAIMS, DEFENSES, AND FEES § 1.4 (2d ed. 1991)). Depending on the claim, the plaintiff may have to prove elements in addition to those of a § 1983 claim. Id. For example, in a suit against a prosecutor for misconduct relating to a wrongful conviction, a plaintiff must establish that the prior criminal proceeding ended in favor of the former defendant. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994) 42 Tenney, 341 U.S. at 376. See also Imbler, 424 U.S. at 424 (noting that after meeting the "history" criterion, the Court must then "determine whether the same considerations of public policy that underlie the common-law rule likewise countenance absolute immunity under § 1983."). ' See Bums v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 486 (1991) . 4 See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 807 (1982) .
See id.
46 See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 419 n.13 (1976) . 41 See Burns, 500 U.S. at 487; see also Harlow, 457 U.S. at 808.
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PROSECUTORIAL IMMUNITY
Conversely, establishing qualified immunity does not automatically defeat the suit against the public official; rather, it sets the standard against which the defendant-official's conduct will be examined. 48 Qualified immunity protects the state actor from liability as long as she does not violate "clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." ' 9 In the context of § 1983 or Bivens claims, qualified immunity is presumed to provide adequate protection for official acts. 50 It reflects a "reasonable balance between the need to protect individual rights and the public interest in promoting the vigorous exercise of official authority." 51 The qualified immunity standard presents a threshold question to the trial court: whether the currently applicable law was clearly established at the time of the alleged constitutional deprivation. 52 If the law was clearly established at the time of the violation, the qualified immunity defense will ordinarily fail, since a public official is expected to know the law governing his office." By contrast, an absolute immunity defense does not require this initial determination. Thus, "the procedural advantage of absolute immunity, the avoidance of civil suit significantly earlier in the legal process, makes it a much more 1)54 attractive and coveted defense than qualified immunity.... ' See Harlow, 
1999]
SUPREME COURT REVIEW
C. DEVELOPMENT OF THE PROSECUTORIAL IMMUNITY DOCTRINE
The United States Supreme Court has specifically addressed the issue of prosecutorial immunity to § 1983 suits four times. 5
Imbler v. Pachtman
Relying primarily on public policy, the Court in Imbler v. Pachtman' 6 held that a prosecutor is absolutely immune from civil suit for activities in initiating and prosecuting a case or by otherwise performing acts "intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process. '' 57 After admitting to his involvement in a robbery, Paul Imbler was charged with the murder of a victim who was killed during prior robbery. 58 Despite Imbler's alibi for the first robbery, police believed that Imbler had committed it as well. 9 Imbler was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death.6 Released after nine years of incarceration due to the discovery of new evidence, Imbler sued Pachtman, the prosecuting attorney, and various other police officers under § 1983, alleging a conspiracy to violate his civil rights. 6 1 The district court found that Pachtman was immune from civil suit for the alleged acts.
6 ' The court granted his motion to dismiss because his actions fell into the category of "acts done as The Ninth Circuit affirmed, finding that the alleged acts were prosecutorial activities integral to the judicial process, and therefore, that Pachtman was protected from Imbler's suit by absolute immunity.6
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address for the first time whether a state prosecutor, acting within the scope of his duties in initiating and prosecuting a case, could be sued under § 1983.r5 The Imbler Court focused the inquiry on the "immunity historically accorded [to the prosecutor] at common law and the interests behind it."6 The Court also stated several policy justifications for absolute rather than qualified prosecutorial immunity. First, frivolous suits by defendants would divert prosecutors' attention from enforcing criminal law. Second, such suits would prove an evidentiary challenge to prosecutors since they would have to prove they acted in good faith usually years after a criminal trial.6 Third, the threat of liability would discourage prosecutors from bringing suit in cases where they thought acquittal was a significant possibility; whereas the proper course of action would be to let a jury decide the defendant's guilt or innocence. 69 Finally, reviewing judges might refrain from reversing convictions for fear of triggering a suit against the prosecutor. 70 Although the Court did not indicate what level of immunity applied to prosecutors engaged in nonadvocatory work, the Court acknowledged that some pretrial work was an implicit part of advocacy. 7 Cathy Burns' two sons were shot while sleeping at home. 7 5 During the probable cause hearing, at which police sought a search warrant, an officer testified that Burns had confessed to shooting her children. 6 Neither the officer nor Reed, the Chief Deputy Prosecutor, told the judge that the confession was obtained under hypnosis or that when conscious Bums had consistently denied shooting her sons. The judge issued the search 78 warrant based on the misleading presentation.
The State charged Bums with attempted murder. 7 9 However, because the judge suppressed the statements she made under hypnosis, the prosecutor dropped all the charges against her. s Bums then sued Reed and others under § 1983. The district court granted Reed a directed verdict based on his assertion of absolute immunity. 8 ' The Seventh Circuit affirmed, declaring that "a prosecutor should be afforded absolute immunity for giving legal advice to police officers about the legality of their prospective investigative conduct." 82 Although the Supreme Court did affirm the district court's grant of absolute immunity for Reed's testimony at the probable 73 500 U. S. 478 (1991) . 71 See id. at 481. 75 See id. 76 See id. The police had consulted Reed, the prosecutor, as to whether hypnosis was an acceptable investigative technique, and Reed told the officers to proceed. Id. at 482. Once the officers obtained the "admission" under hypnosis, they once again consulted Reed, and Reed advised the officers that they "probably had probable cause" to arrest Burns. Id.
'n See id at 482-83. 4 The Court analogized Reed's testimony at the hearing to that of a witness at trial, who enjoyed common law immunity even before the passage of § 1983." However, the common law did not absolutely immunize a prosecutor's advising police to arrest a suspect. 86 The Court rested its conclusion on the lack of historical support for the action, despite the policy reasons supporting protection of the action articulated by the Seventh Circuit and the United States as amicus curiae. The Court also reasoned that the major policy justification for absolute prosecutorial immunity-the risk of disruptive, harassing litigation-is absent where it is unlikely that a suspect would know of the prosecutor's advice to the police.ss Furthermore, the Court noted that it would be unfair to accord prosecutors absolute immunity for supplying advice to police while granting only qualified immunity to police officers for accepting and acting on that advice.8
Writing for the concurring justices, Justice Scalia agreed that Reed deserved absolute immunity for "eliciting false statements in a judicial hearing," 9 and qualified immunity for providing legal advice to police officers. 91 He wrote separately to acknowledge Burns' separate cause of action for malicious prosecution based on her assertion that Reed knowingly secured the search warrant without probable cause.
92
Reviewing the common law as it existed in 1870, Scalia found three categories of immunity. 93 First, statements made during "a court proceeding were absolutely privileged against See Burns, 500 U.S. at 489-92. ' 
1999] 877
SUPREME COURT REVIEW ... defamation."
94 Second, judicial immunity, which was also absolute, was granted for all acts "relating to the exercise of judicial functions." 9 Finally, a variation of judicial immunity, "quasi-judicial immunity," was extended to government servants performing discretionary functions short of adjudication. 96 Quasi-judicial immunity was not absolute and could be overcome by proving malice. 97 Justice Scalia concluded that prosecutors fell into this third category, and thus deserved only qualified immunity for the act of providing legal advice to the police. 98
Buckley v. Fitzsimmons
In Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 99 the Supreme Court further clarified the scope of absolute prosecutorial immunity by holding that absolute immunity should not be accorded to a prosecutor for false statements made to the media and for allegedly fabricating evidence during the preliminary investigation of a crime. 00 A unanimous Supreme Court held that the prosecutor's statements to the press were non-advocatory and, thus, not entitled to absolute immunity. 0 1 The common law did not absolutely immunize out-of-court statements to the press, but it limited immunityfor defamatory statements to those made during, and relevant to, judicial proceedings.°2 Furthermore, under the functional approach established in Imbler, comments to Id. at 501 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). A Connecticut Superior Court judge, however, did recently refuse to extend absolute immunity to a state's attorney when he was accused of revealing confidential HIV-related information about an assault victim during a court session. See Barese v. Clark, No. CV-96-0389890, 1996 WL 663850 (Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 6, 1996 .
Burns, 500 U.S. at 499 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Id. at 500 (ScaliaJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 7See id. (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 9See id. at 501 (ScaliaJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 9 509 U.S. 259 (1993 the media neither fall under the prosecutor's advocatory role nor connect to the judicial process. 103 A five-to-four majority also held that the alleged fabrication of evidence was not advocatory and, thus, not deserving of absolute immunity. 1°4 The Court stated that the ultimate question was whether the function in question was advocator9 or nonadvocatory.'°5 A prosecutor cannot engage in advocatory acts, however, until probable cause is determined.'O° The Court recognized that [t] here is a difference between the advocate's role in evaluating evidence and interviewing witnesses as he prepares for trial, on the one hand, and the detective's role in searching for the clues and corroboration that might give him probable cause to recommend that a suspect be arrested, on the other hand. When a prosecutor performs the investigative functions normally performed by a detective or police officer, it is "neither appropriate nor justifiable that, for the same act, immunity should protect the one and not the other." 0 7
A determination of probable cause, however, does not automatically entitle a prosecutor to absolute immunity from liability for all actions taken thereafter.'°8 Police'investigative work undertaken even after a finding of probable cause will only deserve qualified immunity."
Conversely, a prosecutor will have absolute immunity when acting in an advocatory capacity in preparation for the prosecution or for trial itself, including the professional evaluation of evidence collected by police officers and the preparation of that evidence for presentation at trial. 10 The dissent argued that the prosecutor's search for the favorable expert ' The third document was a "Certification for Determination of Probable Cause" in which Kalina attested to the truth of the facts set forth therein under penalty of perjury.
27
The judge found probable cause and issued an arrest warrant based on Kalina's assertions.
28
A few weeks after the police arrested Fletcher, Fletcher's attorney discovered errors in the certification and informed Kalina's office.'9 First, Kalina incorrectly stated that Fletcher had no association with or permission to be at the school where his fingerprints had been found.
In The court held that Kalina did not have absolute immunity, and that whether she was entitled to qualified immunity was a question of fact to be determined at trial. 9 Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Stevens held that a prosecutor is not protected by absolute immunity when she attests to facts in support of a finding of probable cause when seeking an arrest warrant. 47 In so holding, the Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit's ruling. 14 8
The Court began by examining the source of prosecutorial immunity, noting the previous caselaw on the issue, and then reiterating the appropriate test to be applied by the Court to determine what level of immunity is proper.
9
Although § 1983 does not expressly codify immunity from the liability it creates, the Court construed the statute to confer immunities that were well settled at the time of its enactment in 1871.5
Turning next to the caselaw, the court summarized its jurisprudence by stating that the cases of late made it "clear that it is the interest in protecting the proper functioning of the office, rather than the interest in protecting its occupant, that is of primary importance" in determining what immunity to accord " ' See id 55 confirmed the importance to the judicial process of protecting the prosecutor when she is serving as an advocate in judicial proceedings, but also illustrated that the defense of absolute immunity is unavailable when the prosecutor is performing a different fimction. In conformity with prior decisions, the Court then confirmed that immunity attaches to "'the nature of the function performed, not the identity of the actor who performed it."" 57
The Court then addressed the case relied upon by the Ninth Circuit in its decision, Malley v. Briggs. 5' Addressing Kalina's conduct, the Court stated that everything short of executing the certification-her determination that the evidence against Fletcher was compelling enough to constitute probable cause, her decision to charge Fletcher, her drafting of the certification, her presentation of the information to the court, and even her selection of the particular facts to include in the certification-involved the exercise of professional judgment. 1 0 However, "that judgment could not affect the truth or falsity of the factual statements themselves. Testifying about facts is the function of the witness, not of the lawyer."' 64 The Court thus found that Kalina performed an act of any competent witness, denied absolute immunity on that basis, and held that § 1983 may provide a remedy when a prosecutor functions as a complaining witness. 1 0 Lastly, the Court rejected Kalina's claim that denying absolute immunity in this instance would have a "chilling effect" on prosecutors.r' Kalina offered no evidence supporting her assertion.167 B. JUSTICE SCALIA'S CONCURRENCE Although Justice Scalia joined in the opinion of the Court, he wrote separately to point out that the Court's functional approach to § 1983 immunity questions "has produced some curious inversions of the common law as it existed in 1 8 7 1 .' 168 Justice Scalia asserted that the thrust of the Supreme Court's recent decisions with regard to prosecutorial immunity was exactly opposite to the common law as it existed in 1871, when § 1983 was enacted. 1 9 The Court's recent cases instructed that prosecutors "have absolute immunity for the decision to seek an arrest warrant after filing an information, but only qualified immunity for testimony as a witness in support of the 
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SUPREME COURT REVIEW warrant." 170 However, according to Justice Scalia, no absolute prosecutorial immunity existed in 1871. ' Justice Scalia outlined three types of immunities that were in existence in 1871.172 First, the common law recognized an absolute judicial immunity which extended to all persons-judges, jurors, members of courts martial, private arbitrators, and various assessors and commissioners-who resolved disputes between other parties or "authoritatively adjudicat[ed] private rights. "' 17 Second, the common law protected witnesses and attorneys from prosecution for statements made during a judicial proceeding. 1 74 Third, a "quasi-judicial" immunity extended to officials who "made discretionary policy decisions that did not involve actual adjudications. "' 75 Justice Scalia likened this "quasijudicial" immunity to the modem "qualified" immunity because it was not absolute; it could be defeated by a showing of malice and absence of probable cause. 7 Reiterating the position he took in Burns v. Reed, 177 Justice Scalia asserted that had prosecutors existed in their modem form in 1871, their functions would have been considered quasi-judicial, and thus, they would have been entitled only to qualified immunity.' 78 If Fletcher brought his case against Kalina in 1871, Justice Scalia asserted, the tort would be Kalina's decision to prosecute Fletcher and Kalina would be liable only if Fletcher could prove that the prosecution was malicious, lacking in probable cause, and unsuccessful.'7 Kalina's false statements as a witness in support of the warrant would not have been an independent actionable tort since such testimony was absolutely protected from 170 Id. (ScaliaJ, concurring) . 17, See id. (Scalia, J., concurring). In fact, even the majority notes that there was no such thing as the modern public prosecutor in 1871. See id. at 506 n.1l. J., concurring that since "complaining witnesses" are subject to suit for their involvement in initiating or procuring the prosecution, then testifying is the crucial event. 18 3 The distinction between "witness" and "complaining witness," namely the involvement in the initiation of the prosecution, was relatively harmless in Malley. ' 84 In Kalina, however, Imbler and Malley "collide to produce a rule that stands the common law on its head: Kalina is absolutely immune from any suit challenging her decision to prosecute or seek an arrest warrant, but can be sued if she changes 'functional categories' by providing personal testimony to the Court." "'5 Despite this departure from the common law, Justice Scalia urged adherence to Imbler and the functional approach to immunity questions since they are "so deeply embedded in our § 1983 jurisprudence" that stare decisis governs. 
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SUPREME COURT REVIEW ns190 applied the functional test, holding that absolute immunity extended to a prosecutor only while acting as an advocate, which the Court limited to the period following a determination of probable cause. Kalina does not build on Burns and BuckLey. Rather, Kalina is better seen as a third direct qualification of the broad rule of absolute prosecutorial immunity set forth in Imbier.
Kalina highlights trends in the Court's analysis of absolute prosecutorial immunity cases. Where a prosecutor performs advocatory functions not intimately associated with the judicial process, the Court looks to the common law of 1871 and weighs the Imbler policy considerations to determine whether to extend absolute immunity to the prosecutor. 9 ' Where a prosecutor performs an investigative or administrative activity, the Court consults the common law but declines to weigh the Imbler policy considerations. Where a prosecutor performs a nonadvocatory, non-administrative, and non-investigatory activity, the Court again declines to consider policy when the function enjoys no common law support for absolute immunity and can be performed by other individuals. 93 Burns identified a singular function, advising, 194 that would not be protected by absolute prosecutorial immunity. 9 5 Burns concluded that a prosecutor's provision of legal advice to the police, although advocatory, was not so "'intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process"' that it deserved absolute prosecutorial immunity.1 6
The.Court came to that conclusion by noting the lack of historical support for immunity for the activity and the lack of other policy reasons justifying the extension of absolute immunity to that activity. 9 7 In reaching its " 509 U. S. 259 (1993) . See also supra Part II.C.3. "' Bums v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478 (1991). ,9 Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259 (1993). ' 9 Kalina v. Fletcher, 118 S. Ct. 507 (1997).
1"
The Burns Court did not term the activity of providing legal advice to police as "advising," but I will hereafter refer to the activity as such.
,9 Burns, 500 U.S. at 493. ' Id. at 493 (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976) [Vol. 89 conclusion, the Court consulted the policy considerations identified in Imber. 98 Although the Court did not identify advising as investigative or administrative, Burns directly qualified the rule set forth in Imbler. Buckley chipped away further at the administrative and investigative ambiguity left by Imbler. It too directly qualified Imbler's rule by identifying separate functions for which a prosecutor would not be accorded absolute immunity. In Buckley, the prosecutor's search for a sympathetic bootprint expert was investigative, and his convening of the grand jury to consider the evidence the work produced was administrative.
Furthermore, the Court denied absolute immunity to the prosecutor for holding a press conference, not because the activity was administrative or investigative, however, but because "a prosecutor is in no different position than other executive officials who deal with the press.,, 2 00 The Court declined to examine public policy considerations when concluding that statements to the press deserved only qualified immunity, reasoning that when "the prosecutorial function is not within the advocate's role and there is no historical tradition of immunity on which [the Court] can draw, [the Court 's] inquiry is at an end., 20 ' Likewise, the Court did not weigh the Imbler policy considerations when it could neatly characterize the prosecutor's activity as administra-202 tive or investigative. In Kalina, the Court examined what the prosecutor asserted was advocatory conduct-attesting to facts to support a finding of probable cause-and distinguished the preparation of the affidavit from its actual execution.
2 3 This distinction, while it identified another function for which absolute immunity will be denied to a prosecutor, does not help to clarify the continuing ambiguity surrounding the line between a prosecutor's advoca-
1' See id.
9 See Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 275-76 (1993 Although the Court did not explicitly identify attesting as being beyond the scope of a prosecutor's advocatory duties, it has done so implicitly. First, the Court denied absolute immunity to the prosecutor for attesting to facts as a complaining witness. 20 Applying the Imbler standard, the Court found that Kalina was not acting as a advocate in initiating or presenting the state's case when she attested to facts supporting probable cause, and thus was not entitled to absolute immunity. Furthermore, the Court did not recognize attesting as an administrative or investigative responsibility of the prosecutor's office; it did not constitute normal non-quasi-judicial activity 2°9 for which qualified immunity would be appropriate. Kalina's activity, attesting, was one that "any competent witness might have performed., 2 10 Furthermore, the common law did not provide historical support for extending absolute immunity for its performance. Thus, Kalina was not entitled to absolute immunity.
204 SeeKenner, supra note 12, at 425.
20"
The Kalina Court did not term the activity of attesting to facts in support of probable cause as "attesting," but I will hereafter refer to the activity as such.
' 04 See Kalina, 118 S. Ct. at 507. 207 See id. at 510.
2'See id. at 509. ' Normal non-quasi-judicial activity is conduct performed by a prosecutor that is unrelated to the judicial process. See Anthony J. Luppino, Supplementing the Functional Test of Prosecutorial Immunity, 34 STAN. L. REv. 487, 505 (1982) .
2'0 Kalina, 118 S. Ct. at 509.
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Last, and most strikingly, the Court went so far as to admonish prosecutors against attesting. 21 ' This more than anything else reveals the Court's sentiment that attesting is beyond the scope of a prosecutor's duties. The Court did, however, extend qualified immunity to Kalina in accordance with law set forth in Harlow v. Fitzgerald 12 and the immunity granted to complaining witnesses at common law.
215
This analysis helps to discern the method by which the Court resolves prosecutorial immunity cases. The Court's analysis in Kalina is similar to that in Burns in that both cases identify a new function, neither administrative nor investigative, for which absolute immunity is unavailable. However, in Burns, because the activity was within the role of the prosecutor as advocate, the Court then consulted the policy considerations enumerated in ImbLer to determine whether extending the absolute immunity doctrine was justified. 2 4 It did not do so in Kalina, for it regarded attesting to be outside the scope of a prosecutor's duties. In Buckley, the Court also by-passed the policy analysis where it could characterize the prosecutor's activity as administrative or investigative, 2 15 and where the activity was outside the role of the prosecutor and had no common law foundation. 6 The analysis in Kalina, then, is most analogous to that conducted by the Court in Buckley of the prosecutor's statements at a press conference. Both attesting and giving a press conference were outside the scope of a prosecutor's duties as advocate, and neither were accorded absolute immunity at common law. Thus, in Kalina and in Buckley with regard to the giving of a press conference, the Court did not consider the Imb/er policy factors.
2. See id. at 509 and n.17, 510. 21 457 U.S. 800, 816-18 (1982) ("[G] overnment officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known."). 212 See Kalina, 118 S. Ct. at 508 n.14.
214 See Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 493-96 (1991 ). See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 424-29 (1976 . See Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 275-76 (1993) . 
21-
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The Kalina Court did, however, note a new policy consideration uniquely triggered by the scenario of the case. The Court questioned the appropriateness of prosecutorial attesting in light of the rules of professional ethics. 217 B. KAL!NA WAS CORRECTLY DECIDED Kalina's value springs from the clarity of the opinion and message.
2 18 The case instructs that when a prosecutor acts as a complaining witness, she will be granted only qualified immunity. 219 A unanimous Court proclaimed that a prosecutor's attestation to false facts will not be protected under the guise of professional judgment. 220 The Court gave deference to the exercises of professional judgment that are involved in preparing and obtaining an arrest warrant, but it appropriately protected only the means by which a court reaches the truth and renders justice. 22 ' The Court was clear in articulating that it will not infringe upon the prosecutor's decision whether or not to seek an arrest warrant; it just refused to protect the prosecutor from li-222 ability for attesting.
Even if Kalina's actions were difficult to categorize, an examination of the policy considerations concerning the extension of immunity to prosecutors would readily reveal that a grant of absolute immunity would have been inappropriate in Kalina. Imbler provides the starting point for identifying the factors to consider. 23 Generally, Imbler factors balance the harm to the prosecutor's ability to exercise discretion against the harm to defendants in denying redress. 4 the principles in Imbler. (1) the potential number of ensuing civil suits; (2) the associated costs of time and effort in defending the suits; (3) the reluctance of prosecutors to point out later-discovered exculpatory evidence; (4) the danger that judges will be less prone to reverse convictions if doing so might lead to a prosecutor's liability; and (5) the ability of the justice system to "check" or correct the effects of misconduct in performing the function in question. 2 2 Kalina identified another policy consideration: whether the prosecutor's activity would violate the rules of professional ethics. 226 Although the Court did not specifically address them, many of the aforementioned policy considerations supporting the extension of absolute immunity to a prosecutor are absent in Kalina. First, denying absolute immunity to a prosecutor who attests to facts in order to support a finding of probable cause would not significantly harm the prosecutor's ability to exercise discretion on behalf of the state. The Court specifically acknowledged and vowed to protect the prosecutor's exercises of professional judgment involved in preparing and obtaining an arrest warrant. 227 Furthermore, the prosecutor presented no evidence that the administration of justice would be harmed if the King County practice of having the prosecutor attest to facts in support of probable cause were no longer followed. 228 A prosecutor need not fill the role of complaining witness when she does not have first hand knowledge of the facts. As such a role is not within a prosecutor's necessary functions, denying absolute immunity to a prosecutor acting as a complaining witness does not impair her ability to exercise discretion in her advocatory role.
Second, in light of the fact that there is no sound policy supporting extension of absolute immunity to prosecutors at- Third, the potential for suits against a prosecutor for attesting to facts might be equal to or even greater than the number of suits brought against the original witness. Room for error exists in the communication of the facts from the original witness to the prosecutor. Real world experience instructs that greater accuracy resides in the person closest along the chain of communication to the events in dispute. Where a prosecutor attests to facts communicated to her by another person, she is more likely to mischaracterize or misrepresent them than she would be if she witnessed the events herself, thus making it more probable that a defendant's constitutional rights would be impacted and that a defendant would bring suit. The facts of Kalina nicely support this point. 20 Finally, the justice system provides a method to correct the prosecutor's conduct in Kalina. It may require the person with first hand knowledge, normally the police officer, to attest to the facts. Although more troublesome in some situations to the prosecutor to require the police officer, or whomever supplied the prosecutor with the facts, to attest to those facts supporting probable cause, policy justifications weigh in favor of doing so. The integrity of the criminal justice system would be strengthened by such a rule. Our justice system places a premium on truthful witness testimony. To encourage Kalina's conduct by guarding it with absolute immunity contradicts the system's principles. Striving to help to guarantee the truthfulness of wit- ' See id at 507-08. 2" The Certification for Determination of Probable Cause to which Kalina attested summarized the evidence against Fletcher generated by the police investigation. See Brief for Petitioner at 5, Kalina v. Fletcher, 118 S. Ct. 502 (1997) . Kalina did not collect the evidence herself, she merely relied upon the police report to draft the Certification. See id. at 7. Kalina could have miscommunicated the police findings in the Certification.
[Vol. 89 ness statements should forever be the Court's objective. As Justice White noted in his concurrence in Imbler, absolute prosecutorial immunity is "also based on the policy of protecting the judicial process.... It is precisely the function of a judicial proceeding to determine where the truth lies." 231 For reasons besides those articulated by courts, it is sound policy to hold prosecutors to the qualified immunity standard for attesting to facts to support the issuance of an arrest warrant, because to hold otherwise would cause substantial harm to the judicial process and the administration of justice. Arrest warrants arising from false facts given by a prosecutor would leave innocent citizens without any legal remedy. Furthermore, a potential for abuse exists with such a rule; without the possibility of liability, a prosecutor could obtain arrest warrants with abandon. Fourth Amendment warrant procedures are a protection that can only be enforced by the courts, 3 2 a fact that reinforces the Court's need to protect the integrity of the system in such a way.
Lastly, the Court's rule in Kalina creates the incentive for prosecutors to investigate the facts reported to them by the police. Although the Court cautioned prosecutors against attesting to facts to support probable cause, it did not prohibit such activity. 2 33 Should prosecutors, like those in King County, Washington, continue to attest to facts, they open themselves up to possible liability. Knowing this, they will more thoroughly inquire into the facts reported by the police and be more cautious about executing such supporting documents. While Kalina will affect how prosecutors do their jobs, it will do so in a positive way.
C. THE WAKE OF KALINA
Lower courts have applied Kalina with ease.
2 -They are, however, still testing the limit of its holding. S. 523, 528 (1967) . " See Kalina, 118 S. Ct. at 509-10. " ' See e.g., Aponte Matos v. Toledo Davila, 135 F.3d 182, 187 (1st Cir. 1998 ) (relying, in part, on Kalina to accord qualified immunity to a police officer who filed an affidavit containing allegedly false facts in support of a search warrant);
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principle, the Supreme Court's decisions have frequently held that a state official's absolute immunity should extend only to acts in performance of particular functions of his office.2 6 But the Court also has refused to draw functional lines finer than "history and reason" would support. 237 In Kalina, the Court drew a line between prosecutorial advocacy and participation. The boundaries of that line remain unclear, however, and the lower courts, zealously following the Court's sentiment that qualified immunity provides adequate protection to most functions, have at times denied absolute immunity based on Kalina in sometimes unfounded circumstances.m Thus, while Kalina is a sound opinion with a rule easy for lower courts to apply, overextension of its rule has already occurred.
Roberts v. Kling
In Roberts v. Kling, 23 9 the Tenth Circuit addressed a case with facts similar to Kalina. The court appropriately relied upon Kalina in reaching its conclusion, and the case exemplifies the easy application of the Kalina rule. 240 In Roberts, a former criminal
